By Dr. Brian O’Donnell | Aurex Insights | June 2026
Ireland’s Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2025 passed its final stages in the Oireachtas this week – a development that sounds technical, but is anything but. It is the constitutional step that puts Ireland back on a credible path toward full ratification of the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), just as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney arrives in Dublin for his first official visit with a mandate to deepen economic ties.
The timing is significant. CETA has been provisionally applied since 2017, so the agreement has already been shaping behaviour for years. Two‑way Ireland–Canada trade in goods and services has risen from about €3.2 billion in 2016 to over €10 billion in 2023. Irish goods exports to Canada have climbed from €0.9 billion to €4.1 billion, while imports from Canada have increased from €0.5 billion to €1.2 billion over the same period. Canadian figures show merchandise trade of $6.0 billion in 2025, on top of services flows worth $3.6 billion in Canadian exports to Ireland and $4.3 billion in imports from Ireland in 2024.
Politically, both governments are now talking openly about opportunity. Ottawa has cast Carney’s trip to Ireland and France as part of a push to diversify partnerships across trade and technology, while Dublin has signalled that the visit will focus on strengthening economic ties and progressing CETA ratification. Increasingly, Canadians view Ireland as a trusted partner and an English‑speaking gateway to Europe, with trade ‘definitely’ escalating in part because of recent turbulence in Canada–US relations.
The question for Ireland is no longer whether CETA matters. It is whether the State will now complete the ratification process, explain the safeguards clearly and help firms use a corridor that still has substantial room to grow. Recent Canada–Ireland work suggests strategic action could unlock around US$1.5 billion in additional goods trade and a further US$571 million in services each year.
Why this Bill matters
The Government describes the Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2025 as the legislation that enables Ireland to ratify CETA and similar investment‑protection agreements in a way that respects the Constitution. Legal commentary reaches the same conclusion, highlighting that the Bill inserts a new section 25A into the Arbitration Act 2010 to create a bespoke route for enforcing awards under treaties such as CETA and the EU–Chile framework.
This is a direct response to the Supreme Court’s Costello judgment. The Court held that Ireland could not proceed with ratification on the earlier model but indicated that the defect could be cured by expanding the grounds on which Irish courts may review or refuse enforcement of awards. Section 25A takes up that signal by allowing the High Court to refuse enforcement where an award would compromise the constitutional order or the autonomy of EU law.
In short, Ireland is moving from ambiguity to architecture. Rather than simply praising trade openness in principle, it is building the domestic legal framework required to participate fully in a modern EU trade and investment agreement.
A late mover on CETA
CETA is a mixed agreement, so the EU can provisionally apply elements within its competence, but full effect depends on ratification by every member state through their own constitutional processes. As of late 2025, 17 of the EU‑27 had ratified, leaving 10 still to do so, including Ireland.
Ireland is therefore in company rather than alone, but it is undeniably in the slow group. For a country that self‑identifies as a small, open, rules‑based economy, remaining outside full ratification of a flagship EU agreement creates an obvious tension between rhetoric and institutional reality, even with most of CETA already operating on a provisional basis.
A deeper relationship than many realise
The trading and investment relationship between Ireland and Canada has moved far beyond the theoretical. Provisional CETA has already eliminated tariffs on almost all goods, widened access to public procurement and reduced a range of regulatory barriers.
On the Irish side, official figures capture the scale of change:
- Two‑way trade in goods and services has more than tripled since 2016 to over €10 billion.
- Irish goods exports to Canada have risen from €0.9 billion to €4.1 billion; imports have more than doubled to €1.2 billion.
On the Canadian side, merchandise trade reached $6.0 billion in 2025, with Canada exporting $1.1 billion and importing $4.9 billion. Canadian services exports to Ireland were $3.6 billion and services imports from Ireland $4.3 billion in 2024. Bilateral FDI has deepened alongside this: Canada reports Irish investment stock of $28.4 billion, making Ireland its eighth‑largest investor and fourth among European countries, while Irish figures show bilateral FDI rising from €2.5 billion in 2016 to €8.8 billion in 2023.
Behind those numbers lies a tangible jobs story. Canadian companies employ more than 22,000 people in Ireland; Irish companies employ over 19,000 in Canada. This is not a marginal corridor; it is a significant two‑way platform for trade, services and investment.
Independent analysis suggests there is more to come. The Conference Board of Canada’s Beyond Barriers work estimates scope to unlock around US$1.5 billion in additional goods trade and US$571 million in services each year, especially in life sciences, clean technology, digital services and agri‑food. Trade between the EU as a whole and Canada has also reached record highs, with total two‑way trade in 2021 hitting roughly $100 billion.
Why this matters economically
For Ireland, this is about more than a single bilateral relationship. The export base remains heavily concentrated in a small number of markets and sectors, and recent episodes of US tariff policy have underlined the risks of overexposure to any one large partner. A deeper, rules‑based corridor with Canada is part of how Ireland can diversify that risk: adding another G7 partner, anchored in a comprehensive EU agreement, where the commercial fundamentals already look favourable.
For Canada, the logic is similar. Officials and ministers have openly described Carney’s European trip as part of a wider diversification push in a “more dangerous and divided world”, aimed at building a denser web of partnerships beyond the United States. Recent business expansions capture that shift in microcosm: Irish whiskey brands gaining share after Ontario’s removal of many US labels, and manufacturers like Combilift reporting sharply higher Canadian sales as firms deliberately re‑route supply chains away from US‑centred risk.
The real question is whether policy now catches up with these dynamics by making the institutional framework as robust and predictable as the trade itself.
What this means for Irish exporters and SMEs
For Irish firms, especially SMEs and mid‑caps, CETA is as much about predictability and access as it is about tariffs. Canada offers a wealthy, stable, English‑speaking market with strong institutions; CETA reduces many of the friction costs – regulatory uncertainty, customs complexity, procurement barriers – that would otherwise deter smaller players.
Both Canadian and EU assessments highlight the SME angle. Canada emphasises that CETA is designed to make it easier for smaller firms to join international value chains by improving transparency and easing administrative burdens. The Commission’s review found that 44% more EU SMEs now export to Canada than before CETA entered into force.
The Irish footprint is already meaningful. Enterprise Ireland reports that roughly 300 client companies now export regularly to Canada, across sectors such as digital and industrial technology, life sciences, high‑tech construction, fintech, agritech and education. Exports from EI‑backed companies to Canada hit a record €585 million in 2024. Those numbers suggest the corridor is no longer a niche play for a handful of large multinationals; it is a live market for a broad slice of Ireland’s export base.
The next step is to move more of these firms from opportunistic sales into structured strategies: building local partnerships, targeting public procurement, establishing a presence on the ground and using CETA’s disciplines deliberately rather than incidentally.
What this means for Canadian firms
For Canadian firms, Ireland is more than a modest customer. It is an English‑speaking base inside the EU single market with a deep talent pool in technology, finance, life sciences and other internationally traded sectors.
Canadian politicians are now saying this explicitly. James Maloney, chair of the Canada–Ireland Parliamentary Friendship Group, recently described Ireland as “an English‑speaking gateway to Europe” and stressed that there is “still so much opportunity” in the relationship. That message aligns closely with how Ireland has long positioned itself to US investors.
In investment terms, the logic is straightforward: exporting can often proceed under provisional arrangements, but committing capital, people and management attention depends on legal certainty and institutional stability. A clear, constitutionally grounded framework for CETA’s investment mechanisms strengthens the signal Ireland sends to Canadian firms choosing where to place their next European bet.
The sovereignty debate, argued precisely
Investor‑state mechanisms remain controversial and should not be brushed aside. Critics warn that what remains to be ratified – CETA’s investment court system – could grant foreign investors a privileged route to challenge state measures outside ordinary domestic courts. Those concerns speak to broader questions about democratic control, policy space and the balance between investor protection and the public interest.
The Bill does not make those questions disappear. But nor does it simply hand away sovereignty. It exists because the Supreme Court insisted on constitutional safeguards, and it embeds an enforcement filter based on the constitutional order and the autonomy of EU law. The serious debate is therefore about design and calibration: whether the safeguards are sufficient, whether the economic benefits justify the architecture, and how Ireland preserves regulatory capacity in areas such as climate, housing and industrial policy.
A mature trading state should be able to make the case for open, rules‑based commerce while also being exacting about legal design. In practice, long‑term credibility depends on doing both.
What must come next
If the Bill’s passage is to matter beyond the legal community, three things should follow.
- Move clearly from enabling law to ratification. A long pause between legislative preparation and final ratification would simply recreate uncertainty just as both governments are publicly signalling intent to move.
- Turn legal architecture into SME capability. Firms will not benefit from CETA unless they understand rules of origin, procurement channels, customs procedures and sector‑specific provisions. Enterprise agencies, trade bodies and private advisors need to translate CETA and the new arbitration framework into concrete decision tools for boards and management teams.
- Treat the Canada corridor as a deliberate diversification asset. The Carney visit, the Taoiseach’s language on economic cooperation and the underlying data all point to a corridor with both depth and headroom. In a more volatile trading environment, treating it as a strategic asset rather than a side‑story is simply prudent risk management.
The strategic lesson
The deeper significance of the Arbitration (Amendment) Bill 2025 is that it forces Ireland to line up its constitutional framework, trade posture and enterprise strategy. The State has already banked much of CETA’s provisional upside: two‑way Ireland–Canada trade in goods and services has more than tripled since 2016, Irish exports to Canada have surged, and bilateral investment ties have thickened.
The decision now is whether to complete the institutional logic of that choice. In a world where trade politics is fragmenting and resilience has become a strategic economic concern in its own right, the real risk for a small, open economy is not that it builds too many high‑standards links with trusted partners. It is that it leaves one of its most promising transatlantic corridors only half‑built.
For Irish exporters seeking new customers in Canada, for Canadian firms seeking Irish or wider EU customers, and for policymakers thinking seriously about diversification, this is a moment that deserves more than a passing glance. The opportunity is real. The legal questions are real. The task now is to be equally serious about both.
Dr. Brian O’Donnell is Principal of Aurex Insights. Aurex Insights, the focus is on helping Irish and Canadian organisations translate developments in trade, regulation and policy into practical market‑entry and growth strategies.
